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1 Introduction
What is the appropriate domain of a currency area? It might seem at first that the
question is purely academic since it hardly appears within the realm of political feasi-
bility that national currencies would ever be abandoned in favor of any other arrange-
ment.(...) Certain parts of the world are undergoing processes of economic integration
and disintegration, new experiments are being made and a conception of what consti-
tutes an optimum currency area can clarify the meaning of these experiments. [Mundell
(1961)]
This paper revisits the issue of the appropriate domain of a currency area within a
multi-country New-Keynesian open economy framework in which the objectives of the
policy makers are fully micro-founded – i.e., derived directly from the welfare of the
representative household.1 To our knowledge, we are the first to study within this
class of models to what extent the process of formation and enlargement of a monetary
union entails beneficial effects for its citizens by comparing the welfare gains of the
adoption of a common currency or the extension of the currency area with the costs of
renouncing country-specific stabilization policies. According to our main results, there
can be welfare gains from sharing a common currency as long as the currency area is
formed by a group of small open economies. Similarly, it can be desirable to enlarge
the currency area to another group of small open economies. Conversely, integrating
the monetary union with another big country cannot bring about sizeable welfare ben-
efits. Our findings suggest that while the adoption and the enlargement of a common
currency like the ones experienced in Europe could entail welfare benefits for all the
countries involved, there is no reason to try to implement a monetary union between
two big economic areas like the eurozone and the U.S.
In our model, the costs of losing monetary autonomy are those identified by Mundell
(1961) as the main cost of being in a currency area: when countries share the same cur-
rency, monetary policy cannot properly stabilize country-specific shocks.2 Conversely,
the source of welfare benefits comes from the internalization of a standard terms-of-
trade externality according to which open economy policy makers try to manipulate the
terms of trade at other countries’ expense. While this cannot be considered the only
potential source of welfare benefits ensued from a monetary union – the literature on
currency areas3 emphasizes, for example, the reduction in transaction costs,4 the cut in
hedging costs against exchange rate uncertainty, the increase in price transparency and
the consequent increase in trade enhanced by all these factors,5 the anti-inflationary
reputation effects6 – this type of externality is the natural candidate to rationalize the
1See Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Benigno and Woodford (2005).
2Notice how by featuring nominal rigidities and labor immobility across countries, the New-Keynesian
open economy frameworks are more suited than others to capturing the costs of a monetary union as
originally described in Mundell (1961). This is one of the main reasons why we put our contribution within
this literature.
3For a recent review of this literature, see Silva and Tenreyro (2010).
4Alesina and Barro (2002) incorporate transaction costs – in the form of trade costs – into a model and
show that the desirability of currency unions increases as the world number of countries rises and the average
country size falls. Yet, in their analysis, the objectives of the policy makers are ad hoc.
5There is a vast empirical literature investigating the effects on trade between countries of adopting a
common currency. See, for instance, Rose and van Wincoop (2001) and Silva and Tenreyro (2010).
6Note that the sources of gains deriving from the adoption of a monetary union are mostly microeconomic
and thus difficult to embed into a standard open economy model, as a welfare analysis would require. Apart
from the internalization of policy externalities here considered, the other main source of macroeconomic
benefits identified by the literature is the possible improvement in the ability of the central bank to commit
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existence of a currency area within a New-Keynesian framework: a framework which
is widely used for monetary policy analysis. Indeed, the terms-of-trade externality
arises implicitly in many New-Keynesian open economy models and has been exten-
sively studied in the open macro literature,7 which, however, tends to underestimate
the ensued welfare losses, by usually considering a two country setup.8
Differently, we use a multi-country small open economy framework. This modeling
choice allows capturing one key feature of the EMU and its enlargement, i.e. the
fact that the EMU includes several countries – initially eleven. At the same time, it
emphasizes how a group of small open countries tends to generate stronger externalities
than a single large open economy. This result is potentially relevant even outside the
New-Keynesian literature and independently of the specific externality here considered,
since it makes clear that the behaviour of the small open or big economy policy makers
can generate quite different aggregate effects. Indeed, in our setting the welfare gains
of a currency area formed by small open economies are generally larger than those of a
monetary union formed by big economies. Intuitively, when economies are small, policy
makers take as given what happens in the rest of the world, disregarding completely
how their independent policies jointly affect the global economy and the efficient use
of the world’s resources. By contrast, policy makers of big economies internalize to a
large extent the impact of their decisions on the world aggregate outcomes.
The framework of our analysis is a standard New-Keynesian open economy model
in which the world is split into two areas, H and F . In each area, there is a continuum
of small open regions. Each region produces a bundle of differentiated goods. The
trade elasticity is allowed to be different from one, to nest the cases in which home
and foreign bundles are both substitutes and complements. Results are always shown
for different values of this elasticity, since it plays a crucial role in determining the
strength and the direction of the terms-of-trade externality.9
In this setup, we consider three different policy regimes (A, B and C). Under
regime A, in area H exchange rates are flexible and each small open economy has
its own autonomous central bank; by contrast, in area F all regions share a common
to anti-inflationary policies. However, the credibility of the monetary authorities can be equally enhanced
in other ways – for example by reinforcing central banks’ independence and their mandate to pursue price
stability – which do not imply renouncing to an important policy instrument for macroeconomic stabilization.
7See e.g. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), Pappa (2004), Benigno and Benigno
(2003), Benigno and Benigno (2006), Benigno and Benigno (2008) and De Paoli (2009a).
8As Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2010) underlined on page 915, the empirical relevance of the terms-
of-trade externality as a motive shaping optimal monetary policies in open economies is an open issue.
They also mention how, in the past, the debate on this issue has been influenced to some extent by the
corresponding debate – and the possible skepticism – in the trade literature on the optimal tariff argument
(an argument going back to Johnson (1953), but more recently put forward by, for instance, Grossman and
Helpman (1995) and Bagwell and Staiger (1999), who use it to motivate the need for trade agreements).
Interestingly, recently there have been several empirical studies in the trade literature (e.g. Broda, Lima˜o
and Weinstein (2008) and Bagwell and Staiger (2011)) finding strong support for the idea that countries try
to improve the terms of trade in their favor, since, for instance, open economy policy makers systematically
set higher tariffs in those sectors where they have more market power. Note, however, that within the WTO
using trade policies strategically is difficult and therefore countries may try to use other policy instruments
to affect their terms of trade. For example, Epifani and Gancia (2009) explain the relationship between
government size and openness in the light of the incentive of non-cooperative fiscal authorities to improve
the terms of trade, grounding their results on robust empirical evidence. In conclusion, this new evidence
corroborates the empirical relevance of the terms-of-trade externality as a motive driving open economy
policy maker decisions.
9For a discussion see Tille (2001), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002), Benigno and Benigno (2003), Pappa (2004)
and Corsetti et al. (2010).
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currency and monetary policy is delegated to a single authority (e.g. FED). Under
regime B there is a single currency in each area and monetary policy is under the
control of two independent central banks (e.g. ECB and FED). Finally, under regime
C there is a common central bank for the world economy. Moreover, in all regimes
monetary policies are chosen under commitment and are optimal from the timeless
perspective.10
Under both regimes A and B, optimal policies are biased by the desire of the
monetary authorities to affect the terms of trade in their favor. This incentive stems
from a free riding problem. Through the manipulation of their terms of trade, open
economy policy makers try to increase domestic leisure or consumption at other coun-
tries’ expense. This incentive is common to the policy makers of both large and small
open economies. However, the difference in size of these economies shapes their op-
timal monetary conduct. When the economy is small, its central bank considers its
policy decisions and the performance of the country as irrelevant for the behavior of
the aggregate economy. As a consequence, from the small open economy’s point of
view, strategically manipulating the terms of trade has effects exclusively on domestic
output, while leaving the rest of the world unaffected. In equilibrium, however, the
opposite is true: since the group of small open economies is large, aggregate distor-
tions are substantial. Indeed, the incentive to try to manipulate the terms of trade
in their favor jointly with the inability to internalize the effects of their decisions on
the world economy pushes small country policy makers to sharply deviate from the
Pareto optimum and to shift inefficiently their inflation-output stabilization trade-off.
For this reason, small open economy central banks are more prone to adopt highly
inflationary policies that generate strong negative externalities. In contrast, when the
economy is big, even if they do not internalize the effects of their policies on other
countries’ welfare, policy makers take into account the impact of their decisions on the
world economy equilibrium outcome. They, thus, disagree on how much to produce
and consume individually and they try to manipulate their terms of trade by affecting
domestic and foreign outputs in opposite directions to allow domestic households to
enjoy relatively more leisure or consumption. Nevertheless, they take into account the
feedback effects of their policies stemming from the other area and they recognize the
importance of using the resources available in the world economy efficiently. This is
why large economy central banks tend to adopt monetary policies which are much less
inflationary than those of the small open economy policy makers.
The differences in the conduct of monetary policies explain the differences in out-
comes across policy regimes. Under regime B, policy makers of areas H and F are
exactly symmetric. Both of them generate negative spillovers between areas. Hence,
being under regime C instead of B eliminates these externalities. However, indepen-
dently of the trade-elasticity value, this welfare benefit is always outweighed by the
costs due to the impossibility of properly stabilizing area-specific shocks. This result
suggests that adopting a common currency for two large economies like the U.S. and
the eurozone is not desirable. Conversely, under regime A, while the common central
bank in area F generates aggregate externalities only between areas, monetary policy
makers of the small open economies internalize the spill-over effects neither within nor
across areas. As a consequence, for values of the trade elasticity above 1.8, there are
welfare benefits – which can be substantial11 – for the households living in areas H and
F not only from being under regime B instead of A, but also from being under regime C
10See Woodford (2003), Benigno and Woodford (2005) and Benigno and Woodford (2012).
11Especially if compared with those found in previous studies on monetary policy coordination (e.g. Ob-
stfeld and Rogoff (2002)) and in the business cycle literature (e.g. Lucas (1987) and Lucas (2003)).
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instead of A. These findings suggest that for a group of small open economies it can pay
to form (or enlarge) a monetary union, since there can be a substantial improvement in
the conduct of the monetary policy once this is delegated to one single authority. This
authority, as a big player in the world economy, recognizes how to use monetary policy
more efficiently since it can better foresee the aggregate macroeconomic consequences
of its policy decisions.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic set up and charac-
terizes the Pareto-efficient allocation. Section 3 discusses the steady state distortions,
the welfare approximations and the optimal policies under the different regimes. Sec-
tion 4 reports the results on the welfare evaluation and Section 5 provides a discussion
of the possible extensions.
2 The basic framework
The world consists of a continuum of small open regions indexed by i ∈ [0, 1].12 The
regions are split into two areas – H and F – of equal size. In area H, there is a
continuum of regions indexed by i ∈ [0, 12), which are independent countries. Area
F consists of regions indexed by i ∈ [12 , 1], which belong to a monetary union. In
each region i, households consume a bundle that includes all the goods produced in
the world economy and supply a continuum of imperfectly substitutable labor services
which are immobile across both regions and areas. The elasticity between domestic and
foreign goods is different from one. Each region produces a continuum of imperfectly
substitutable goods using all the labor services available in the domestic economy.
There is no capital. Good prices adjust according to a staggered mechanism a` la
Calvo. Moreover, there are complete financial markets and the model features perfect
pass-through since the law of one price holds.13 However, even if all good prices are
set in the domestic currency, there are deviations from purchasing power parity since
preferences exhibit home bias for both the domestically produced goods and the goods
produced within the area to which the small open economy belongs. For the sake of
brevity, in this section we discuss the log-linear approximation of the model, while its
full description can be found in Appendix A.14 Table 1 lists the equilibrium equations
for the regions belonging to area H. Symmetric conditions can be stated for the regions
that belong to area F . The variables cˆit, cˆH,t ≡ 2
∫ 1
2
0 cˆ
j
tdj and cˆF,t ≡ 2
∫ 1
1
2
cˆjtdj
15 denote
the log-deviations of consumption in region i and aggregate consumption in area H
and F , while yˆit, rˆ
i
t, sˆiH,t and sˆiF,t stand for the log-deviations of domestic output, the
nominal interest rate and the terms of trade of region i with respect to area H and
F respectively.16 Moreover, m̂cit, piiH,t eˆiH,t and eˆiF,t represent the log-deviations of
region i firms’ real marginal cost, producer price inflation and the nominal exchange
rate of region i relative to a common unit of account of area H and F . We allow for two
types of region-specific shocks: a productivity shock denoted by aˆit and a wage-mark-up
shock µˆit which induces exogenous fluctuations in the wedge between the real wage and
12This model generalizes the framework layout by Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005).
13We discuss the implications of these two assumptions for our main results in more detail in Section 5.
14See also Forlati (2012).
15As a general notation, given the variable Xjt , xˆ
j
t ≡ logXjt − logXj is the log-deviation of Xjt from the
steady state, while xˆH,t ≡ 2
∫ 1
2
0
xˆjtdj and xˆF,t ≡ 2
∫ 1
1
2
xˆjtdj are the average area log-deviations from the steady
state. Moreover, ∆xˆit stands for xˆ
i
t − xˆit−1.
16As standard in the open macro literature, the terms of trade are defined as the aggregate price of
imported goods relative to the aggregate price of the exported goods.
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pii,t = λm̂c
i
t + βEt{pii,t+1} (1)
m̂cit = ϕyˆ
i
t + σcˆ
i
t + (αb − αs)sˆiH,t + (1− αb)sˆiF,t − (1 + ϕ)aˆit + µˆit (2)
yˆit = cˆ
i
t +
[
1− δb
σ(2γb − 1) −
1− δs
σγs
]
sˆiH,t − 1− δb
σ(2γb − 1) sˆiF,t (3)
sˆiH,t = −σγs(cˆH,t − cˆit) (4)
sˆiF,t = −σγs(cˆH,t − cˆit)− σ(2γb − 1)(cˆF,t − cˆH,t) (5)
rit − ρ− Et{pii,t+1} = σEt{∆cˆit+1 + (γb − γs)(∆cˆH,t+1 −∆cˆit+1) + (1− γb)(∆cˆF,t+1 −∆cˆit+1)} (6)
∆eiH,t + piH,t − pii,t = −σγs(∆cˆH,t −∆cˆit) (7)
∆eiF,t + piF,t − pii,t = −σγs(∆cˆH,t −∆cˆit)− σ(2γb − 1)(∆cˆF,t −∆cˆH,t) (8)
Table 1: Equilibrium conditions of region i with i ∈ [0, 1
2
).
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. The underlying
parameters of the model are described in Table 3 in the appendix. In Table 1, equation
(1) is the New-Keynesian Phillips curve which results from the Calvo mechanism. As
usual, current domestic inflation depends on expectations of future domestic inflation
and of the current real marginal cost. In the case of small open region i, the real
marginal cost is equal to the real wage expressed in terms of domestic prices over the
marginal product of labor, i.e., m̂cit ≡ wˆit− pˆit− aˆit. By using the fact that the real wage
in terms of consumer prices is set as a mark-up over the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and labor it can then be shown that in equilibrium m̂cit is given
by equation (2). Equation (3) represents the aggregate demand that in this economy
sums up the demands of domestic and foreign households for home produced goods
and is critically affected by movements in the terms of trade. Conditions (4) and
(5) are a direct consequence of assuming complete financial markets and incorporate
the perfect risk sharing between home and foreign households. Finally, equation (6)
is the IS curve that follows from the Euler equation, whereas (7) and (8) determine
the fluctuations in the nominal exchange rates of region i. Notice that under regimes
B and C, when eiH,t = 1 and eiF,t = 1, equations (7) and (8) can be interpreted
as a constraint imposed by the adoption of a common currency according to which,
in response to asymmetric shocks, the terms of trade cannot adjust instantaneously
because of the sluggish price adjustment and the fixed exchange rates. Differently,
under regime A in area H, when there is monetary autonomy, the fluctuations in the
nominal exchange rates ensure that conditions (7) and (8) are always satisfied. The
equations in Table 1 determine the small open economy equilibrium given domestic
shocks and area H and F aggregate consumption. Integrating these conditions allows
us to recover the aggregate equilibrium equations for area H as stated in Table 2. In
fact, conditions (9), (10), (11), (12) and (13) represent the aggregate Phillips curve,
the equation determining the aggregate firms’ marginal cost, the risk sharing condition
across areas, the aggregate demand and IS curves for area H. Symmetric conditions
apply to area F .
Before moving to the next section, we discuss briefly the differences between the
market equilibrium and the Pareto-efficient allocation in our model. In the absence of
mark-up shocks, our framework embodies two distortions: the steady-state distortion
6
piH,t = λm̂cH,t + βEt{piH,t+1} (9)
m̂cH,t = ϕyˆH,t + σcˆH,t + (1− αb)sˆHF,t − (1 + ϕ)aˆH,t + µˆH,t (10)
yˆH,t = cˆH,t − 1− δb
σ(2γb − 1) sˆHF,t (11)
sˆHF,t = −σ(2γb − 1)(cˆF,t − cˆH,t) (12)
rH,t − ρ− Et{piH,t+1} = σEt{∆cˆH,t+1 + (1− γb)(∆cˆF,t+1 −∆cˆH,t+1)} (13)
∆eHF,t + piF,t − piH,t = −σ(2γb − 1)(∆cˆF,t −∆cˆH,t) (14)
Table 2: Aggregate equilibrium conditions of area H.
due to monopolistic competition and the dynamic distortion caused by price and output
dispersion. Once these distortions are eliminated – which can be achieved by using an
appropriate labor subsidy and by completely stabilizing firms’ marginal costs in all
markets –, the market equilibrium coincides with the Pareto-efficient allocation. In
Appendix B, we retrieve the conditions that characterize the Pareto-efficient optimum.
At the same time, using conditions (10) and (11), we can define:
m̂ceH,t ≡ (σ + ϕ) yˆH,t −
δb − γb
2γb − 1 sˆHF,t − (1 + ϕ)aˆH,t (15)
as the firms’ marginal cost in the absence of mark-up shocks, where the suffix e stands
for efficient.17 A symmetric definition applies to m̂ceF,t, the efficient firms’ marginal
cost in area F . Indeed, it can be shown that stabilizing such costs by setting
m̂ceH,t = 0 m̂c
e
F,t = 0 (16)
ensures, jointly with the equilibrium conditions (11), (12) and its foreign counterparts,
that the average output fluctuations mimic those of the efficient allocation. Intuitively,
when a technology shock occurs and the firms’ marginal costs are held constant, the
dynamic distortion due to price stickiness is corrected and the average area fluctuations
in the marginal rates of substitution and transformation between consumption and
labor are equal.
3 Welfare
As anticipated in the introduction, this paper assesses the costs and benefits of a
monetary union by comparing, in terms of welfare, three policy regimes. Under regime
17Regarding condition (15), recall that δb − γb = (γb − αb)(ησ − 1). As a result, the impact of the terms-
of-trade movements on firms’ marginal cost depends critically on whether domestic and foreign goods are
substitutes or complements in the utility – i.e., on whether the trade elasticity η is greater or smaller than
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/σ. In fact, the parameter η governs an intratemporal effect:
the higher is η the more domestic and foreign households shift the composition of their consumption bundle
in response to a change in the terms of trade. By contrast, the parameter σ governs an intertemporal effect:
the higher is σ, the more domestic and foreign consumers are inclined to change their borrowing and lending
decisions in response to exogenous shocks in order to smooth consumption across periods. These results are
well known in the open macro literature. For a discussion, see Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) and Corsetti et al.
(2010).
7
A, there is a common currency in area F , while countries in area H retain their own
central banks; under regime B, there are two monetary unions, one in area F and the
other one in area H. Under regime C, there is a single authority that sets the interest
rate for the world economy as a whole.
In order to solve the optimal monetary policy problems, we make the following as-
sumptions. Independently of the policy regime, monetary authorities are benevolent,
take as given other policy makers’ choices and can commit credibly to past and future
promises. In other words, policies are optimal from the timeless perspective. As in Be-
nigno and Benigno (2006), policy makers’ strategies of the policy game under regimes
A and B are specified in terms of the entire path of inflation defined as a time-varying
function of the shocks hitting the economy.18 Thus when maximizing domestic utility
at time 0, these authorities commit credibly to implement the desired state-contingent
path of inflation, taking as given the state-contingent path of inflation chosen by for-
eign policy makers.19 Under these hypotheses, we use the linear-quadratic approach
pioneered by Benigno and Woodford (2005) and Benigno and Woodford (2012) to
determine the optimal policies under the different regimes.20
3.1 The steady-state distortion
As a first step to implement the linear quadratic approach, we show the following
result:21 Under the assumption of equal employment subsidies across regions, there
exists a symmetric deterministic steady state at which zero inflation is a Nash equi-
librium of the Ramsey policy game under both regimes A and B. A similar finding
arises under regime C.22 At the zero-inflation steady state Y = C = (1− τ˜)− 1σ+ϕ
where Y and C represent the steady-state levels of output and consumption, while
τ˜ ≡ 1− (1− τ)(1 + µ) εε−1 . Then, (1− τ˜)MRS = (1− τ˜)CσY ϕ = 1 = MRT . In other
words, τ˜ determines the steady-state wedge between the marginal rates of substitution
and transformation between consumption and leisure.
Given their different objectives, the policy makers of the small open economies and
of the monetary unions have different incentives and different ideas about what is the
efficient steady-state level of domestic output.
Consider first the case of a cooperative policy maker. Not surprisingly, at the
deterministic steady state, this policy maker finds it optimal to choose τ˜ = 1 − (1 −
τ)(1 + µ) εε−1 = 0 so that Yw = 1. With this policy, she manages to implement the
Pareto optimum, offsetting the monopolistic distortions in both the labor and the goods
markets and closing completely the wedge between marginal rates of substitution and
transformation. Then, we can define Φw ≡ τ˜ as a parameter that governs the steady-
state distortion from the world economy policy maker’s viewpoint.
Consider now the case of the small open economy i. The efficient steady state from
the small open policy maker’s perspective is equal to:23
18Namely, we study the open-loop Nash equilibrium.
19Notice that given this assumption, under regime A, small open economy central banks take as given all
the aggregate variables. Intuitively, if the economy is infinitesimally small, its performance cannot influence
aggregate variables.
20Actually, it would be difficult to compute these policies using standard perturbation methods, since the
economy is framed as a continuum of small open regions.
21See the online appendix for a discussion of the zero-inflation steady state and also of other accessory
results like the welfare approximations, the welfare-relevant targets and the optimal policy problems.
22For a formal proof, see Benigno and Benigno (2006).
23On the formal derivation of this result and the following one for the case of the big economy policy
maker see Forlati (2012).
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Ys = δ
−1
σ+ϕ
s (17)
where δs ≡ γsησ+αs(1− ησ) can be interpreted as the elasticity of region i output to
region i consumption. According to (17), τ˜s = 1− δs is the optimal labor subsidy that
decentralizes the correspondent steady state allocation as a market equilibrium. Then,
Φs ≡ τ˜ − τ˜s can be picked as a parameter that measures the steady-state distortion
from the small open economy’s perspective.
Condition (17) also points out how the small open economy policy makers do not
aim to reach the Pareto-efficient steady state at which the monopolistic distortions are
exactly eliminated unless δs = 1. As long as δs > 1 (δs < 1), they would prefer a lower
(higher) level of steady-state production. Consider, for instance, the parametric con-
figuration ησ > 1 where domestic and foreign goods are substitutes in the utility and
δs > 1. In this case, the authorities of small open economies try to lower output in or-
der to improve the terms of trade and to externalize labor effort at the other countries’
expense. Indeed, as the terms of trade ameliorate, consumers at home borrow more
(intertemporal effect), enjoy more leisure and possibly reduce their demand for domes-
tic goods since foreign goods have became cheaper (intratemporal effect). Domestic
consumption falls relative to foreign consumption. However, its fall is dampened by
the rise in borrowing and in the demand for goods produced abroad. Hence, domestic
consumption decreases less than output. As a consequence, the rise in leisure due to
the reduction in the labor supply more than compensates households for the fall in
consumption generated by the terms-of-trade improvement.
Suppose now that αs1+αs < ησ < 1. In this case, δs is still greater than one. Intu-
itively, even if home and foreign goods are complements in the utility, consumers find
it optimal to borrow more. In this way, they can dampen the reduction of the overall
expenditure for consumption reducing their labor supply at the same time. Still, home
consumption falls less than output and small open economy policy makers try to im-
prove their terms of trade. However, when ησ < αs1+αs – and then δs < 1 –, home and
foreign goods are strong complements and this incentive is reversed. Small country au-
thorities seek to increase domestic output. The intuition for this result is provided by
Corsetti et al. (2010) in Section 5.1. As domestic and foreign goods are complements in
the utility the marginal utility, from consuming domestic goods increases with the con-
sumption of foreign goods. Then, domestic policy makers seek to import more foreign
goods by raising domestic production. Despite the implied terms-of-trade worsening,
domestic consumption of both home and foreign produced goods increases, more than
compensating the reduction in leisure in the utility. Finally, if δs = 1, Φs = Φw. Then,
the steady-state level of output is efficient from the small open economy viewpoint and
coincides with the Pareto-efficient level i.e., Ys = Yw.
In contrast, in the case of the policy maker of the monetary union, the desired level
of steady-state output in the domestic economy is determined as:
Yb =
[
1− (1− δb)(σ + ϕ)
(δbϕ+ γbσ)
] −1
σ+ϕ
. (18)
This allocation can be achieved as market equilibrium by choosing a labor subsidy of
τ˜b =
(1−δb)(σ+ϕ)
(δbϕ+γbσ)
where δb ≡ γbησ + αb(1 − ησ). At the same time, we can define:
Φb ≡ τ˜ − τ˜b as the analogue of the parameters Φw and Φs for the case of the big
economy.
According to (18), even in such a case, policy makers seek to manipulate the terms of
trade to their own advantage. Yet differently from the case of the small open economy,
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Figure 1: Desired level of steady state domestic output as a function of the trade elasticity
η under complete markets.
the key parameter that governs this incentive is 1 − δb. Depending on whether δb
is greater or smaller than 1, policy makers of the big economies would like to under-
subsidize or over-subsidize labor, with respect to what would be Pareto efficient. Again
when δb = 1 there is no incentive to manipulate the terms of trade. Thus, in this case
domestic output is distorted from the big economy viewpoint only when the steady
state is not Pareto efficient, i.e., Yb 6= Yw.
To summarize the above discussion, Figure 1 plots the desired level of domestic
output24 for the three cases considered – namely, the cases of the world, the small
open economy and the big economy policy maker – as a function of the trade elasticity
η and using the baseline parameterization: i.e., αs = 0.6, αb = 0.85 σ = 2 and
ϕ = 3. The line with triangles shows the level of steady-state output under the baseline
parameterization.
For most values of η, policy makers of both small and big economies want to under-
subsidize labor to improve their terms of trade. However, this incentive is significantly
stronger for the small open economy policy makers. For instance, when η = 2, Yb
and Ys are respectively 11.5% and 27.13% lower than Yw, the Pareto efficient level of
output. The reasons for this outcome are threefold. First of all, bigger countries are
less open. As a consequence, the incentive of their policy makers to improve the terms
of trade is weaker. Secondly, big economy authorities realize that they hold monopoly
power only on the terms of trade between areas and they internalize the external effects
produced within the monetary union. Finally, they take into account the impact of
their policies on the foreign economy. All these motives contribute to the weakening
of the desire to influence the terms of trade.
Summing up, the difference in size between small and big countries affects the
strength of the incentive to generate externalities at the steady state. Under the
baseline parameterization, for almost all the values of the trade elasticity, the desired
24We could have alternatively shown the level of the desired subsidies.
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steady-state level of domestic output is closer to Pareto efficiency in the case of the
monetary union. As will become evident in the next sections, this difference in in-
centives is key to explaining even the differences in optimal policies over the business
cycle. Indeed, if the steady state is distorted from their own perspective, monetary
policy makers seek to manipulate household and firm behavior over the business cycle
in order to drive what we call the per period output and the per period terms of trade
(i.e., the expected level of output and of the terms of trade) towards their desired levels.
3.2 The benchmark: the case of cooperation
The second step of the linear quadratic approach requires us to retrieve a purely
quadratic approximation to the monetary authorities’ objectives, by using the second-
order approximation to the structural equations and then to express this approximation
in deviations from the welfare-relevant targets so as to interpret it as a loss function.
In this section, we consider the benchmark case of cooperation in which there is a com-
mon authority that maximizes the world welfare.25 As shown in the appendix available
online, we can approximate the objective of the cooperative policy maker as:
1
1− τ˜
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
2
E0
[
$11,w
∫ 1
2
0
(s˜wiH,t)
2di+$11,w
∫ 1
1
2
(s˜wiF,t)
2di+$12,w(y˜
w
H,t)
2
+$12,w(y˜
w
F,t)
2 +$13,w(s˜
w
HF,t)
2 +$4,w
∫ 1
0
(pii,t)
2di
]
+ t.i.p. (19)
where $11,w, $12,w and $13,w depend on the structural parameters of the model,
and t.i.p. stands for “terms independent of policies”. Moreover, in (19) we use the
convention by which x˜wt ≡ xˆt − xˆwt , namely, x˜wt is the gap between the variable xˆt and
the corresponding target of the world policy maker xˆwt . Consistently with the open
macro literature, for instance with Benigno and Benigno (2006) and Corsetti et al.
(2010), the welfare loss in (19) is expressed as a function of regional inflations, area-
specific output gaps and terms-of-trade gaps between areas and between regions and
areas. Inflation and terms-of-trade gaps account for the inefficient dispersion of output
across firms, and across regions and areas respectively. If all these gaps were closed,
the welfare loss would be zero and the equilibrium allocation would coincide with
the welfare-relevant target. In general, this target can be conceived as the allocation
that a policy maker would choose, taking into account the steady-state distortion due
to monopolistic competition, or a distortive labor subsidy, but abstracting from the
dynamic distortion generated by firm price dispersion. For this reason its analytical
expression helps to disentangle what drives policy makers’ incentives.
In the case of cooperation, the target of the cooperative authority satisfies the
following conditions:26
[1− ζw(ϕ+ 1)] m̂ce,wH,t = ζw(ϕ+ 1)µˆH,t [1− ζw(ϕ+ 1)] m̂ce,wF,t = ζw(ϕ+ 1)µˆF,t (21)
25This approximation of the welfare will then be used to retrieve the objective of the central bank of the
world monetary union in regime C.
26See the online appendix for the full set of equations that determine the target of the cooperative policy
maker. For the sake of simplicity, we limit the discussion of the target of the cooperative authority to the
average-area variables. However, it can be shown that similar conditions hold for single regions:
[1− ζw(ϕ+ 1)] m̂ce,wi,t = ζw(ϕ+ 1)µˆit (20)
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where m̂ce,wH,t and m̂c
e,w
F,t are defined consistently with (15). From (21), we draw the
following conclusions about the goals of the cooperative authority:27
1. The trade-off. The cooperative monetary policy maker faces a trade-off between
stabilizing completely the firms’ marginal costs at their efficient level (i.e., m̂ce,wH,t =
0 and m̂ce,wF,t = 0) and allowing m̂c
e,w
H,t and m̂c
e,w
F,t to fluctuate in response to mark-
up shocks.
2. The weights of the trade-off and the steady-state distortion. The coefficients 1−
ζw(ϕ+ 1) and ζw(ϕ+ 1) correspond to the relative weights attached to the trade-
off and depend critically on the Φw, the parameter that governs the steady-state
distortion. In fact, since ζw =
Φw
(σ+ϕ) , ζw = 0 if and only if Φw = 0. As a result,
if the steady state is Pareto efficient (i.e., Φw = 0) we go back to the standard
finding of closed economy literature – emphasized, among others, by Woodford
(2003) and Gal´ı (2008) – and completely stabilizing firms’ marginal costs at their
efficient level is the target of the monetary policy maker.
3. The case for price stability. Independently of whether the steady state is distorted
or not, if shocks are only to technology, strict-inflation targeting is optimal. In-
tuitively, even when Φw 6= 0, the monetary policy maker does not try to correct –
not even partially – the steady-state distortions because the welfare gains derived
from the improvement of per period output towards efficiency are exactly offset
by the costs associated with firm output dispersion.
4. Mark-up shocks. Under mark-up shocks, the monetary authority is willing to
allow m̂ce,wH,t and m̂c
e,w
F,t to fluctuate over the cycle to the extent to which the
steady state is distorted. In particular, if the per period output is inefficiently
low – i.e., if Φw < 0 –, the monetary policy maker wants output to negatively
co-move with mark-up shocks. As a result, she changes her inflation output
stabilization trade-off and under-stabilizes output – namely, she stabilizes it less
than what she would do if the steady state were efficient. The higher Φw, the
stronger this incentive is.
At first, the fourth result is quite puzzling: we might expect that the central bank
would aim to completely stabilize output and consumption (as in fact it is willing to
do when the steady state is efficient). Instead, it wants output and consumption to
co-move with these shocks. The underlying reason for this behavior can be understood
by considering the expected value of the labor supply schedule in its closed economy
counterpart in the absence of shocks to technology, namely:
E
{
Wt
Pt
}
= E
{
Y ϕ+σt
}
E {(1 + µt)}+ Cov
{
Y ϕ+σt (1 + µt)
}
. (22)
According to (22), the lower the covariance between mark-up shocks and output, the
lower is the per period output for a given level of per period real wage. This condition
then explains why the cooperative authorities have an incentive to manipulate strate-
gically the effects of uncertain mark-up shocks on households’ behavior. By providing
worse – or better – insurance against these shocks the cooperative central bank can
induce households to raise – or reduce – their average labor effort. If, for instance,
per period output is inefficiently low, policies that raise the negative co-movements be-
tween output and mark-up shocks have beneficial welfare effects: they shift the average
labor supply curve downward, allowing for an efficient increase in the expected level of
production.
27Most of these conclusions are the same as those of Benigno and Benigno (2006).
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As a final last step of the linear quadratic approach, we use (19) to set up the policy
problem and recover the optimal policy under regime C. Then, in the tradition of the
macro literature,28 we rearrange the related first-order conditions to obtain:
$4,w
(
1
2
piH,t +
1
2
piF,t
)
+
$12,w
λ(σ + ϕ)
(
1
2
∆y˜wH,t +
1
2
∆y˜wF,t
)
= 0 (23)
Condition (23) represents the optimal targeting rule for the world currency area. Ac-
cording to this rule (and the aggregate world Phillips Curve), in general, and not
surprisingly, the world policy maker faces a trade-off between stabilizing the average
world inflation and the average world output gap, a trade-off akin to that highlighted
in the closed economy literature by Benigno and Woodford (2005). Consistently with
the previous discussion, in the presence of only technological shocks the policy maker of
the world currency area completely stabilizes the average world inflation. Conversely,
under mark-up shocks she stabilizes inflation only partially, taking into account how
the covariance between these shocks and output influences per period output.
3.3 The case of the small open economy
As shown in the appendix available online, the objective of the small open economy
policy maker of country i in area H can be approximated in terms of output gap,
terms-of-trade gaps and inflation as:
1
1− τ˜
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
2
E0
[
$1,s(y˜
i,s
t )
2 +$11,s(s˜
s
iH,t)
2 +$12,s(s˜
s
iF,t)
2 +$4,s(pii,t)
2
]
+ t.o.c. (24)
where $1,s, $4,s, $11,s and $12,s are a function of the model’s deep parameters and
x˜st stands for the deviation of xˆt from the target of the small open economy policy
maker, i.e., x˜st ≡ xˆt − xˆst . In addition, t.o.c. represents “the terms out of the control”
of the monetary authorities and contains both the terms independent of monetary
policy and the aggregate variables of areas H and F . Beside the variables included,
what is crucially different in the welfare approximations (19) and (24) are the weights
attached to inflation, output gap and terms-of-trade gaps. These weights embed the
policy trade-offs faced by the small open economy central bank and determine its policy
target which needs to satisfy the next condition:29
[1− ζs(ϕ+ 1)]m̂ce,si,t = ζs(ϕ+ 1)µˆit + κsH sˆsiH,t + κsF sˆsiF,t. (25)
In (25), m̂ce,si,t is the efficient level of firms’ marginal cost in country i, defined as the
small open economy counterpart of (15). Comparing (25) with (20), its analogue for
the cooperative case, allows us to stress the following findings:
1. The trade-off. The small open economy policy maker faces a trade-off between:
stabilizing firms’ marginal cost at its efficient level, affecting the covariance be-
tween output and mark-up shocks to drive the per period terms of trade towards
its efficient level and manipulating the terms of trade that are relevant from the
small open economy’s viewpoint over the cycle. The relative strength of these
three incentives depends critically on the coefficients 1− ζs(ϕ+ 1), ζs(ϕ+ 1) and
both κsH and κ
s
F respectively.
28See Woodford (2003) and Corsetti et al. (2010) among others.
29See the online appendix for the full set of equations that determine the target of the small open economy.
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2. The weights of the trade-off and the steady-state distortion. As was discussed
for the cooperative case, ζs is determined by Φs, the parameter that, in turn,
determines the steady-state distortion from the perspective of the policy makers
of the small regions. In fact, ζs =
Φs
δsϕ+γsσ
. Then, ζs = 0 if and only if Φs = 0,
i.e., the steady state is efficient from the viewpoint of the small open economy.
However, differently from the cooperative case, even when Φs = 0, stabilizing
marginal cost fluctuations at their efficient level is not the target of regional
authorities: they still trade off between this incentive and the desire to influence
terms-of-trade volatility to their own advantage. As a result, in general, strict
inflation targeting cannot be optimal even when shocks are only to technology
and the steady state is not distorted from the small open economy’s perspective.
3. The case for price stability. Under the parametric restriction ησ = 1, it follows
that κsH=κ
s
F=0 and the target of the small open economy policy makers in the
presence of technological shocks turns out to replicate the flexible-price alloca-
tion. This finding is independent of whether the steady-state distortion has been
eliminated by an appropriate labor subsidy (i.e., independent of whether Φs = 0)
and is consistent with the conclusions of the previous literature (see Benigno and
Benigno (2003), Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) and De Paoli (2009a)). Intuitively,
when ησ = 1, domestic output fluctuations are independent of the terms of trade
since the intertemporal and the intratemporal effects exactly compensate and the
terms-of-trade movements do not induce domestic households to change their
consumption and labor decisions. Then, the policy makers of the small open
economies anticipate that they cannot affect aggregate households’ behavior by
using the terms of trade over the cycle strategically.
4. Mark-up shocks. As in the case of cooperation, the target of the small open
economy authorities reacts to domestic mark-up shocks if and only if the steady
state is inefficient from the small open economy’s perspective (i.e., if Φs 6= 0).
More precisely, suppose that the small open region policy maker has an incentive
to improve her per period terms of trade (i.e., Φs > 0 ). Then, she can affect the
covariance between output and mark-up shocks. The mechanism works exactly
as in the case of the cooperative policy maker. By stabilizing output more than
inflation30 in response to mark-up shocks, small country authorities can induce
domestic households to lower their per period labor effort. As a result, per period
domestic output – which is perceived as too high – can fall, improving the terms
of trade.
5. The terms-of-trade volatility. When ησ 6= 1, it follows that κsH 6= 0 and κsF 6= 0. In
other words, if ησ 6= 1, independently of whether the steady state is considered
efficient or not, the policy makers of the small open countries are willing to
influence the terms of trade over the cycle. Notice that since κsH and κ
s
F depend
critically on Φs, they use the manipulation of the terms-of-trade volatility also
to drive the expected levels of the terms of trade and output towards the desired
levels.31
Finally, the welfare losses in (24) allows us to formulate the optimal monetary policy
problem of the small open economy policy maker. Using the corresponding first-order
conditions, we can write the optimal targeting rule of the small open economy policy
30as long as δsϕ+γsσϕ+1 > δs − (1− τ˜).
31These incentives are explained more in detail in Forlati (2012).
14
maker as follows:
$4,spii,t +
δs$1,s
λ(σγs + ϕδs)
∆y˜i,st +
σγs$11,s
λ(σγs + ϕδs)
∆s˜siH,t +
σγs$12,s
λ(σγs + ϕδs)
∆s˜siF,t = 0 (26)
Condition (26), jointly with the small open economy equilibrium equations, determines
the equilibrium allocation under optimal policy. Notice that the difference between
this allocation and the target is due exclusively to the additional distortion, the price
dispersion, a consequence of the Calvo pricing, the small open economy maker has to
cope with under optimal policy. In fact, the incentives discussed in the first part of
this section while considering the target in (25) explain the behavior of the small open
economy central bank even when implementing the optimal policy. According to (26)
and in line with De Paoli (2009a), in general the small open economy policy maker
faces a trade-off between stabilizing domestic inflation, output gap and terms-of-trade
gaps. This trade-off reflects her desires to manipulate the terms of trade over the
business cycle and correct the steady-state distortion from the small open economy’s
perspective. Only when the ησ = 1 and there are only productivity shocks, strict-
inflation targeting is the optimal rule.
The above discussion makes it clear that the behavior of the small open economy and
cooperative policy makers are quite different. However, what will prove to be crucial
for our findings is the difference in the perceptions of the steady-state distortions.
This difference can explain why for high enough values of trade elasticity, small open
policy makers are inclined to engage highly distortionary monetary policies in response
to mark-up shocks. The strong incentive to deviate from the efficient level of the
per period output shifts inefficiently their inflation-output stabilization trade-off and
pushes small open economy central banks to adopt a monetary policy stance which is
substantially less aggressive than that of the cooperative policy maker.
3.4 The case of the big economy
If there is a monetary union in area H, the objective of the monetary policy maker can
be approximated in terms of welfare-relevant gaps as:
1
1− τ˜
∞∑
t=0
βt
1
2
E0
[
$15,b(y˜
b
H,t)
2 +$16,b(s˜
b
HF,t)
2 +$17,b(y˜
b
F,t)
2 +$4,bpi
2
H,t
]
+ t.o.c. (27)
where $4,b, $15,b, $16,b and $17,b depend on the fundamental parameters of the model
and x˜bt ≡ xˆt − xˆbt stands for the deviation of the variable xˆt from the target of the
area H central bank xˆbt . In addition t.o.c., “the terms out of control” of the policy
maker, include the state-contingent path of piF,t decided by area F policy maker and
the differentials between country-specific and average-union variables.32 To grasp some
insights about the incentives driving the policy maker of the monetary union, we use
the next expression:
[1− ζb(ϕ+ 1)] m̂ce,bH,t = ζb(ϕ+ 1)µˆH,t + κbH sˆbHF,t
−(ζw − ζb)(ϕ+ 1)m̂ce,bF,t = (ζw − ζb)(ϕ+ 1)µˆF,t + κbF sˆbHF,t (28)
32Indeed, without loss of generality, we assume that by choosing the average-union inflation, the common
central bank cares only about the average performance of the currency area. However, these terms have to
be taken into account in the welfare evaluation.
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Again m̂ce,bH,t and m̂c
e,b
F,t are defined consistently with (15). This condition, jointly
with the other conditions listed in the online appendix, determines the target of the
big economy. By contrasting (28) with its counterparts, (21) and (25), we reach the
following conclusions:
1. The trade-off. According to (28), big economy policy makers face a trade-off
between: stabilizing the fluctuations of average-area efficient marginal costs, ma-
nipulating the covariances between output and mark-up shocks of both areas
and influencing the volatility of the terms of trade between areas. The relative
strength of these incentives depends critically on the coefficients 1 − ζb(ϕ + 1),
ζb(ϕ+ 1) , κ
b
H , −(ζw − ζb)(ϕ+ 1), (ζw − ζb)(ϕ+ 1) and κbF .
2. The weights of the trade-off and the steady-state distortion. In the case of the big
economy – differently from the cooperative case – the monetary authority of area
H attaches different weights to the stabilization of domestic and foreign efficient
marginal costs. This is because the per period terms of trade at the symmetric
steady state are inefficient from the area H policy maker’s perspective. Indeed, the
weight of domestic marginal cost is 1−ζb(ϕ+1) where ζb = Φb(γbσ+δbϕ)(σ+ϕ)((2γb−1)σ+(2δb−1)ϕ)
and is determined by Φb. Then, as long as δb > 1 and Φb 6= 0, the authority of
the monetary union tries to push domestic per period output toward a level that
is inefficiently low from the cooperative viewpoint. In contrast, the weight of the
foreign marginal cost is −(ζw − ζb)(ϕ + 1) and corresponds – as long as δb > 1
– to the intention of driving foreign per period output towards an inefficiently
high level. In other words, in this case, the policy maker in area H seeks to push
domestic and foreign per period output in opposite directions to generate – as
long as δb > 1 – an improvement of the cross-area terms of trade. However, the
average weight corresponds to that of the cooperative authorities, i.e., 1− ζb(ϕ+
1) − (ζw − ζb)(ϕ + 1) = 1 − ζw(ϕ + 1). Despite the conflicts with other policy
makers, the monetary authority of the large economy wishes to make efficient use
of the resources available in the world economy.
3. The case for price stability. When ησ = 1, it follows that γb = δb. As a conse-
quence, κH = 0 and κF = 0 and m̂c
e,b
H,t = 0 and m̂c
e,b
F,t = 0. Then, under pro-
ductivity shocks, implementing the flexible-price allocation becomes the target of
the common central bank and strict inflation targeting the optimal policy. This
result is consistent with other findings in the open macro literature, for instance
Benigno and Benigno (2003) and Benigno and Benigno (2006). The intuition is
exactly the same as explained for the case of the small open economies. Open
economy policy makers internalize that if ησ = 1 there is no reason to manipulate
the terms of trade because they cannot influence domestic output.
4. Mark-up shocks. Only when Φb 6= 0 or −(ζw−ζb)(ϕ+1) 6= 0, the monetary author-
ity has the additional incentive to try to manipulate strategically the covariance
between outputs and mark-up shocks: by shifting the average labor supply curves
she tries to push domestic and foreign per period outputs towards their efficient
levels.
5. The terms-of-trade volatility. When ησ 6= 1, κbH 6= 0 and κbF 6= 0 and similarly
to small open economy authority, the monetary authority of the area seeks to
affect strategically the terms of trade volatility both to drive domestic and foreign
output towards the desired levels and to try to decrease the welfare costs of
consumption and leisure volatilities.
According to the previous discussion, big countries recognize the importance of an
efficient use of the resources available in the world economy. Nevertheless, they disagree
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on how much to produce and consume individually. This free riding problem generates
a conflict that translates into the desire to manipulate the terms of trade between areas.
Countries wish to generate output differentials to allow domestic households to enjoy
relatively more leisure or consumption. This mechanism can even clarify why the size
of the economy can shape optimal policy decisions. When the economy is big, policy
makers behave strategically: they realize that they can influence the terms of trade by
affecting domestic and foreign outputs in opposite directions. At the same time, they
internalize the effects that their policies produce on the foreign economy, even if they
disregard the effects on foreign household welfare. They take into account, for instance,
that when ησ > 1, domestic terms of trade improve, not only the demand of domestic
households but even that of foreign consumers switches from domestic towards foreign
goods, amplifying the effects on output differentials. Differently, in the limiting case of
a small economy, the only way monetary policy can manipulate the per period terms of
trade in its favor is by affecting per period domestic production. In fact, the economic
performance of a small open country is irrelevant for the behavior of the aggregate
economy. However, the joint policies of small open regions in one area can produce
large business cycle effects on both the domestic and the foreign areas.
Finally, we use the welfare loss in (27) to formulate the optimal monetary policy
problem of the area H policy maker. As above, by rearranging the first-order conditions
to this problem we obtain:
$4,bpiH,t+
$15,bξ1
λ(σ + ϕ)ξ2
∆y˜bH,t+
$16,bσ(2γb − 1)
λξ2
∆s˜bHF,t+
$17,bσ(γb − δb)
λ(σ + ϕ)ξ2
∆y˜bF,t = 0 (29)
where ξ1 ≡ σ(γb−δb)+(2δb−1)(σ+ϕ) and ξ2 ≡ (2δb−1)ϕ+(2γb−1)σ. Condition (29)
represents the optimal targeting rule of the monetary union central bank and jointly
with the other equilibrium conditions determines the best response of the policy maker
in area H given the state-contingent path of piF,t. Symmetric conditions can be stated
for the foreign area to determine the Nash-equilibrium policies under regimes A and B.
The interpretation of the policy prescription in (29) is quite clear: once the distortion
generated by the nominal rigidities is taken into account, the central bank in area H
faces a trade-off between stabilizing domestic inflation, output gaps and the terms-of-
trade gap. These gaps embed the incentives of the policy maker of the monetary union
discussed above: on the one hand the need to use the world resources efficiently; on
the other hand the desire to manipulate the terms of trade between areas at the steady
state and over the business cycle. Indeed, consistently with the discussion above and
with Benigno and Benigno (2006), price stability is a Nash-equilibrium policy under
regimes A and B if shocks are to productivity and ησ = 1. However, in general, this
is not the case, since the central bank of the monetary union balances the need to
stabilize domestic inflation with the incentive of affecting the terms of trade over the
cycle and of reducing the perceived steady-state distortion, by, for instance, influencing
the covariances between mark-up shocks and output.
4 Welfare evaluation
There is a crucial question that is still left unanswered. What is the appropriate
domain of a monetary union from the perspective of area H (and F ) households? Are
the consumers of areas H and F better off under regimes A, B or C? The solution
to the optimal policy problems enable us to evaluate welfare under regimes A, B and
C and to address these questions. Before examining the results on welfare, we discuss
the baseline parameterization.
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4.1 Parameterization
The baseline parameterization of the model shown in Table 4 is chosen with the euro-
zone as a benchmark. The discount factor is set to 0.99 in order to match a steady-
state annual interest rate of 4 percent. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is
set equal to 12 , as in Pappa (2004) and Corsetti et al. (2010), while the labor supply
elasticity is 13 and the import share over GDP of the small open region is 40 percent
(i.e., αs = 0.6) consistently with Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) and De Paoli (2009a).
Conversely, the degree of home bias of the area is set equal to 0.85 in line with Coenen,
Lombardo, Smets and Straub (2010) and Pappa (2004). The elasticities of substitution
across labor types and across varieties produced within the same region are set equal
to 6 and correspond to a 20 percent steady-state mark-up in the goods and in the la-
bor markets respectively. Furthermore, we assume that governments do not subsidize
labor, i.e., τ = 0. As a result, τ˜ is equal to −0.44 and the steady-state wedge between
the marginal rates of substitution and transformation is equal to 1.44, close to 1.38,
the calibration chosen by Benigno and Benigno (2006). In addition, θ, the probability
of resetting the price, is 0.75, implying an average price duration of one year. More-
over, we parameterize the autocorrelation and the standard deviation of productivity
shocks, aˆt as in Coenen et al. (2010). Following De Paoli (2009a) and Benigno and
Benigno (2006) and in line with the findings of Adolfson, Lase´esen, Linde´ and Villani
(2007) we assume AR(1) mark-up shocks, µˆt, with an autocorrelation coefficient, ρµ,
equal to 0.9. We set then the standard deviation of mark-up shocks consistently with
Coenen et al. (2010). Finally, the correlation of productivity shocks across regions is
set according to Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005), while the correlation of mark-up shocks
across regions is half that of productivity.33 A more detailed description of the shock
parameterization is provided in the online appendix.
There is no clear consensus in the literature on the parameterization of the trade
elasticity. If we just focus on the more recent studies, Broda and Weinstein (2006)
and Imbs and Me´jean (2011), for instance, suggest that a reasonable parameterization
of the trade elasticity should lie within 4 and 6 and above 6 respectively. Conversely
using Bayesian techniques, Rabanal and Tuesta (2010) estimate this elasticity to lie
below 1, consistently with the results of Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2008a). Then, in
line with De Paoli (2009b) and Rabitsch (2012) we allow the trade elasticity to vary
from 0 to 3.934 and within this range we study the welfare gains across the different
regimes.
4.2 Welfare gains of a monetary union
The analysis of the previous sections reveals that in our setting there are potential
welfare benefits from the adoption of a common currency. Moreover, it makes clear
what the sources of these benefits are: a more efficient use of the resources available in
the economy, the internalization of the spill-over effects generated within area H and
the gains from controlling the terms of trade across areas. Nevertheless, these benefits
could be offset by the cost of being in a monetary union generated by the inability of the
central bank to properly stabilize country specific shocks. We use then the household
welfare based criterion derived in (19) and its equivalent for area H to quantify the
33Notice that this choice corresponds to a conservative configuration of this parameter. We check the
sensitivity of our results to a change in ςs,b in Forlati (2012).
34This range ensures that under the baseline calibration second-order conditions for the optimal policy
problems are satisfied in all regimes and purely random policies cannot be welfare improving. For a discussion
on this issue, see Benigno and Benigno (2006) and Benigno and Woodford (2005).
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net gains from being in a currency union expressed as a fraction of the corresponding
steady-state consumption. Figure 2 shows the differences in welfare under the baseline
calibration between being under regimes A or B (first two plots), B or C (third plot)
and A or C (fourth plot) for both domestic and foreign households as a function of the
trade elasticity η. A change in such elasticity implies a change in the desired levels of
per period output and in the corresponding perceptions of the steady-state distortion.
Three noteworthy conclusions can be drawn from this figure:
1 As the first plot suggests, if there is a group of small open economies that decide
to be in a monetary union, welfare gains can be large. When η is greater than
1.8, the net benefits for the domestic households are positive and can reach the
considerable size of 27.8 percent of steady-state consumption as η approaches the
value of 3.9.35 At the same time, there can be welfare losses if η is sufficiently
small. However, these losses are on average lower than the potential gains espe-
cially if we exclude the smallest values of η, which are not very plausible. The
interpretation of this finding is quite clear. For high enough values of η the costs
of a monetary union due to the impossibility of properly stabilizing region-specific
shocks are offset by the benefits associated with the internalization of the negative
externalities produced by the small open economies.
In fact, as η increases and domestic and foreign goods become better substitutes
in the utility, the perceived steady state distortion and the incentive of the small
country policy makers to improve per period terms of trade become stronger
and stronger.36 Hence their monetary policy exacerbates substantially the en-
sued negative externalities both within and across areas. This is so since their
economies being small, the regional central banks take as given what happens in
the world economy. Thus, they disregard (as opposed to the monetary authority
of a currency area) how their joint policy decisions affect the efficient allocation
of resources of the world economy and the average performances of both areas H
and F .
2 According to the third plot of Figure 2, under the baseline calibration there are
no welfare gains from being in a monetary union between the two areas. In this
case welfare losses fall in the range of −0.0096 and −0.0012 of the steady-state
consumption. Intuitively, if in this case the costs of being in a currency area
are smaller, benefits are smaller, too, because the monetary authorities of the
big economies are more concerned about inflation stabilization and less prone to
adopting policies that generate negative externalities on the other area. In fact,
monetary authorities of a currency area take into account how their decisions
affect not only the domestic but also the foreign economy performance. They
realize the importance of an efficient allocation of resources of the world economy
as a whole, whereas small open economy policy makers do not.
3 According to the fourth plot, if η is large enough, households of area F , and even
those in area H, benefit substantially from being in a monetary union with the
small open economies of area H. Again, the rationale of this result is explained by
the fact that joining the monetary union can discipline the behavior of the small
35We have not plotted the values of the welfare gains for η equal to 3.9 because altering its scale renders
the figure unreadable. Similar sizes of welfare gains are found in the robustness checks provided by Forlati
(2012).
36As our analysis on the welfare relevant targets suggests, this incentive translates into potentially more
expansionary – and then more inflationary – monetary policy. This conclusion can be even inferred by the
impact responses to a global mark-up shock reported in Forlati (2012).
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Figure 2: Welfare gains of a monetary union.
open economy policy makers. Put differently, as evident from the second plot
small country policies are welfare detrimental even for the foreign area. Therefore,
according to this result there is a rationale for the households of area F to be in
a monetary union that includes the small open countries.
We can now use the previous findings to characterize the appropriate domain of a
currency area such as the European monetary union. According to our results, for
sufficiently large values of η, there are welfare gains from the adoption of a currency
like the euro for consumers living in an area like the eurozone. From the perspective of
these consumers, it might be a good idea to try to foster the process of enlargement of
the euro to other European countries. Conversely, it seems that being in a monetary
union with a big country like the U.S. cannot bring about sizable welfare benefits
for domestic and foreign households. In Forlati (2012) we check the sensitivity of
our findings to a change in several parameters: σ−1, the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution; αb, the degree of home bias, ςs,µ and ςb,µ, the correlations of mark-up
shocks across regions and areas, τ , the employment subsidy, ρµ, the autocorrelation
of mark-up shocks and σµ, the standard deviation of mark-up shocks. The results are
quite robust to these changes.
5 Possible Extensions
In our framework, under coordination the optimal policy consists of the same monetary
policy prescriptions followed in a closed economy. In this case, what Blanchard and
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Gal´ı (2007) called divine coincidence holds. Under efficient shocks – as in a closed
economy – it is optimal to completely stabilize firms’ marginal costs so as to eliminate
the cost of inflation and at the same time to reach efficient business cycle fluctuations.
In this context, the fluctuations in the real exchange rate reflect the movements in the
relative prices of exports versus imports and favor the efficient allocation of resources,
consistently with the classical view described in Friedman (1953). As emphasized by
Corsetti et al. (2010), the classical view hinges on three assumptions: that financial
markets are complete ensuring perfect risk sharing; that there is perfect exchange rate
pass-through and that domestic policy makers do not engage any strategic manipula-
tion of their terms of trade. In this paper, we analyzed extensively the consequences of
relaxing the third assumption for optimal monetary policies and the gains of forming
a monetary union. We show that the attempt to manipulate the terms of trade ren-
ders small open economies more prone to adopt inflationary policies which can imply
non-negligible welfare losses for the economy as a whole. However, we follow part of
the literature37 by assuming complete financial markets and the law of one price. In
this section, we discuss to what extent these two assumptions can be critical for our
results, providing new possible directions for future research.
Imperfect Pass-Through. There is a vast body of empirical studies suggesting that
the exchange rate pass-through is incomplete. For instance, according to Campa and
Goldberg (2005) the exchange rate pass-through in the OECD countries is 0.46 in the
short run and 0.64 in the long run, far, then, from the unitary pass-through implied by
the assumption of Producer-Currency Pricing (PCP). In order to reconcile this empir-
ical evidence with the model predictions, a strand of the open macro literature38 has
introduced the assumption of pricing to market i.e., the assumption that the prices of
the foreign goods consumed domestically are set in the home currency – the so called
Local-Currency Pricing (LCP). Under this assumption, the same good is sold at differ-
ent prices at home and abroad and the fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate are
not transmitted to import prices, generating an inefficient misalignment in the prices
of imports and exports. For this reason, assuming LCP breaks down the divine coinci-
dence. Indeed, under LCP in response to asymmetric productivity shocks, inflation in
the domestic and export destination markets cannot be jointly stabilized, since export
prices are set in foreign currency and therefore cannot fully adjust to nominal exchange
rate movements.39 As a result, even under technological shocks the cooperative policy
maker faces a trade-off between stabilizing consumer price inflation, which includes
import price inflation, international relative price misalignments and the output gap.40
Given these findings, we can expect that assuming LCP in our framework would in-
troduce the same additional distortion, i.e., the relative price misalignment, which will
change the transmission mechanism of monetary policies across regions and the incen-
tives of open economy policy makers over the business cycle. However, even if allowing
for LCP is potentially an interesting extension of our analysis, there are at least two
reasons why the previous considerations should not raise major concerns for our results.
On the one hand, we can reasonably presume that the mechanism explaining our main
findings on the gains of being in a monetary union will be at work even under LCP.
37E.g., Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (2002), Benigno and Benigno (2003), Pappa (2004), Gal´ı and Monacelli
(2005), Benigno and Benigno (2006), Gal´ı and Monacelli (2009) and De Paoli (2009a).
38See, for instance, Devereux and Engel (2003), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), Corsetti et al. (2010), Corsetti
et al. (2011) and Engel (2011).
39In fact, most prices of domestic exports (those of non-reoptimizing firms) do not change under LCP,
weakening the expenditure switching effect.
40On this result see Corsetti et al. (2010) and Engel (2011).
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Indeed, since the assumption of LCP introduces only an additional source of nominal
rigidities, we can easily conjecture that the allocation at the zero-inflation steady state
and the steady-state distortions as depicted in Figure 1 remain the same. As em-
phasized above, the difference in the perception of the steady-state distortion is what
mainly drives monetary policy makers’ optimal decisions and thus the welfare benefits
under the different regimes. On the other hand, as made clear by Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2000) and Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2008b), while assuming LCP renders the ex-
change rate pass-through incomplete, it also implies a model prediction at odds with
the empirical evidence. Indeed, for levels of price stickiness consistent with the most
recent estimates provided, for instance, by Gopinath and Rigobon (2008), Nakamura
and Steinsson (2008) and Midrigan (2011), a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate
tends to translate into an improvement rather than into a worsening of the domestic
terms of trade as shown by the results of Corsetti et al. (2010).41 Put differently, the
debate on how to square the empirical evidence on the imperfect pass-through and on
the correlation between the exchange rates and the terms of trade with the predictions
of open macro models is still open. In this respect, the contribution of Corsetti et al.
(2008b) points out, for example, how pricing to market is not the only factor that can
explain the deviations from the law of one price. Real factors that generate endoge-
nous fluctuations in the mark-up of imported goods, like the introduction of a sector
of non-tradable services through which traded goods are distributed to consumers, can
also help, bringing at the same time the predicted correlation between the exchange
rates and the terms of trade closer to the data. One of the next challenges of the
open macro literature should be to build a tractable open economy workhorse model
that fits the evidence on the incomplete pass-through, on the correlation between the
exchange rate and the terms of trade and on the nominal rigidities. Such a framework
would allow us to identify more clearly the transmission mechanism of monetary policy
across countries and to study the optimal monetary policy design under cooperation
and non-cooperation jointly with the welfare gains of a monetary union.
Incomplete Financial Markets. As emphasized by Corsetti et al. (2010), once we al-
low for incomplete risk sharing – specifically, when there is either financial autarky
or areas and/or regions trade only a nominal bond – the flexible price allocation is
not efficient. The impossibility of perfectly smoothing consumption across states or
times due to the lack of trade in financial assets causes what Corsetti et al. (2010)
call cross-country demands imbalance and currency misalignments. For instance, un-
der financial autarky, provided that η is large enough, a positive productivity shock
implies an excessive increase in domestic demand relative to the level reached under
complete markets, which brings about an overvaluation of the real exchange rate. In-
tuitively, since there is no way to transfer output to future periods, the rise in current
output enhanced by the technological improvement results in an increase in current
consumption above efficiency. The main implication of the lack of perfect risk shar-
ing for optimal monetary policy under cooperation is then clear: depending on the
parameterization under incomplete markets, cooperative monetary policy makers have
to use monetary policy to dampen or amplify the effects of macroeconomic shocks on
41As explained by Corsetti et al. (2010), under LCP and Calvo pricing, the exchange rate pass-through for
the firms that cannot reoptimize is zero. Then, in response to a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate,
the domestic terms of trade can improve because ceteris paribus the prices of the exported goods produced
domestically by the non-reoptimizing firms increase. At the same time, the exchange rate pass-through for
the firms that readjust their prices is positive with the consequence that the prices of the imported goods
produced by foreign reoptimizing firms increase and generate a pressure for a terms-of-trade worsening.
Which effect prevails in equilibrium is determined by the degree of price stickiness.
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consumption and output in order to correct for cross-country demand imbalances and
exchange rate misalignments. Interestingly, it turns out that under non-cooperation
assuming incomplete markets not only introduces an additional policy trade-off over
the business cycle, but even changes the way in which open economy policy makers
attempt to manipulate the terms of trade in their favor at the steady state.
Why this is the case can be grasped from Figure 3, the equivalent of Figure 1 under
incomplete markets. Figure 3 shows the desired levels of steady-state output for small
open economy and big economy policy makers as a function of the trade elasticity η.
In fact, it can be shown that, similarly to what happens under complete markets, the
desired levels of steady-state output of both the small and the big open economies
under financial autarky can be written as:42
Y is = δ
i
s
− 1
σ+ϕ Y ib =
(
1− (1− δ
i
b)(σ + ϕ)
(σ − 1) + (ϕ+ 1)δib
)− 1
σ+ϕ
(30)
where i stands for incomplete markets and δis ≡ η(1+αs)−αsη(1+αs)−1 and δib ≡
2αb(η−1)
2αbη−1 are the
parameters governing the elasticity of consumption to output in the small and big
economies, respectively.
Figure 3 exhibits a common feature with Figure 1: small open economy authorities
tend to produce stronger negative spillovers than those of large countries. However,
there are at least two striking differences between Figures 1 and 3. Under complete
markets, the higher the η, the lower are the desired levels of output. Moreover, the
levels of steady-state output are monotonic functions of η. Differently, under incomplete
markets, the desired levels of steady-state output are not monotonically increasing in
η. For high enough values of η,43 open economy policy makers have an incentive to
undersubsidize labor with respect to what is efficient in order to improve their terms
of trade. In this way, since in equilibrium there is balanced trade, they can import
more for each unit of exports. Production falls and consumption falls too but not as
much as production, so as to improve domestic welfare. The stronger the incentive to
improve the terms of trade, the lower the trade elasticity. In fact, the lower the trade
elasticity, the lower the impact of the terms-of-trade amelioration on foreign demand
for domestically produced goods and the larger the increase in domestic imports for
each unit of exports.
Conversely, when the trade elasticity is low, the behavior of uncoordinated authori-
ties is more puzzling and can be understood recalling the uninsurable effects on wealth,
highlighted by the seminal contribution of Corsetti et al. (2008a)44, that characterize
open economy models under incomplete markets. Indeed, according to Corsetti et al.
(2008a) provided that η is sufficiently low, an improvement of the terms of trade entails
an expansion in the domestic demand of home produced goods, since as the terms of
trade improve, the value of domestic production increases relative to foreign produc-
tion, generating a positive wealth effect that more than offsets the substitution effect
associated with the terms-of-trade improvement. If this wealth effect is strong enough,
open economy policy makers find it optimal to oversubsidize labor with respect to what
is efficient under cooperation. Raising the labor subsidy beyond efficiency generates a
42See the online appendix. Notice that under incomplete financial markets the desired level of steady state
output under cooperation coincides with the Pareto efficient level.
43Specifically, when δis > 1 in the case of the small open economy and when δ
i
b > 1 and at the same time
σ − 1 + (ϕ+ 1)δib > 0 in the case of the large economy.
44Corsetti et al. (2008a) show how imperfect risk sharing combined with low trade elasticities helps to
reconcile international business cycle models with the “Backus Smith” puzzle – i.e., the empirical evidence
that there is a low and negative correlation between the real exchange rate and the relative consumption.
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Figure 3: Desired level of steady state domestic output as a function of the trade elasticity
η under financial autarky.
downward pressure on prices of domestically produced goods and an upward pressure
on the real wage. The positive income effect associated with the latter pushes the home
demand for domestic goods upward, more than compensating for the downward pres-
sure on home prices. As a result, the domestic terms of trade improve and the value
of domestic production increases, allowing for a strong wealth effect that reinforces
the increase in domestic demand for home goods. Output increases but consump-
tion increases by more so as to improve welfare. Notice that in this case the stronger
the incentive of increasing the labor subsidy, the higher the trade elasticity, since the
higher this elasticity the larger the increase in domestic demand for home goods and
the stronger the positive wealth effect.
The above discussion clarifies how relaxing the assumption of complete financial
markets is a potentially interesting extension of our model. In fact, once this assump-
tion is relaxed, the set of parametric configurations under which there are gains from
being in a monetary union presumably changes. However, we can expect that the
main conclusion of our analysis survives even in the absence of complete risk sharing.
Indeed, even under these circumstances the incentive to generate negative externalities
– and then the case for a monetary union – is stronger for the authorities of a group of
small open economies, since these authorities disregard the joint effects of their policies
on foreign economies. For this reason, the assumption of complete financial markets
should not be considered too restrictive. At the same time, given the multi-country set
up we used and the purposes of our paper, focused mainly on the Euro Area which,
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in the recent decades, has been undergoing through a rapid process of financial in-
tegration, assuming that there is either financial autarky or trade only in one bond
could be considered extreme too. In fact, the literature has only partially explored
the consequences of different financial market structure arrangements for the optimal
design of monetary policy, focusing mainly on three cases: complete financial markets,
bond economies and financial autarky.45 A possible interesting direction for future
research could be to extend the analysis even to the cases in which there is trade in
multiple assets, but financial markets are incomplete. In this way, it would be possible
to compare the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, the incentives of monetary
policy makers and the welfare gains of monetary union under a larger range of financial
market arrangements. This type of analysis would, however, be quite complex, even
because it requires us to determine the optimal portfolio dynamics endogenously as
made clear by Devereux and Sutherland (2010).
Other Extensions. Beyond the extensions mentioned above which are strictly related
with the most recent research progresses of the open macro literature, there are at
least two other extensions that could be worth investigating. In our framework, we
assume that there are two areas of equal size and we take the size of the area forming a
monetary union as given. In the spirit of the literature on the optimum currency area,
it could be interesting to study the welfare gains of a monetary union by assuming
multiple areas or allowing for the size of the areas to be different. Being even more
ambitious, one could aim at finding the optimal number of currencies within a New
Keynesian multi-country and multi-area set up.46 Another possible extension could
investigate whether the introduction of a sovereign-debt market and sovereign-debt
spreads could undermine the welfare gains of a monetary union due to the elimination
of beggar-thy-neighbor policies. Notice how this type of extension could help to clar-
ify, for instance, whether a monetary union requires fiscal policy coordination to be
beneficial for its citizens.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides a possible rationale for the process of the creation and enlargement
of the eurozone. It shows that, as long as the monetary union is formed by a group of
small open economies, there can be sizable welfare gains from sharing the same currency
and from extending the currency area to another group of small open economies. Our
findings stem from the incentive of small open countries to generate potentially strong
negative externalities, which lead to large inflation volatility both in the foreign area,
which has a single monetary authority, and in the domestic area, in which the small
open countries still retain monetary autonomy. In this case, delegating the monetary
policy to a common central bank that sets the interest rate for the whole area acts as a
disciplining device against the beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the small open economies.
45On this issue see, for instance, De Paoli (2009b), Corsetti et al. (2010) and Corsetti et al. (2011).
46Note that within this type of analysis it could be worth even to relax the assumption of equal elasticity
for trade between countries within the same area and between areas since in this way it would be possible
to disentangle the terms-of-trade effects across areas from those across countries.
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Parameter Description
β Preferences discount factor
σ−1 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption
η Trade elasticity
ϕ−1 Frisch elasticity of labor supply
αs Degree of home bias in the regions
αb Degree of home bias in the areas
ε Elasticity of substitution across varieties
ν Elasticity of substitution across labor types
θ Probability of resetting prices
λ (1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ
ρ −log(β)
γs
1
αs
γb
αb
2αb−1
δs γsησ + αs(1− ησ)
δb γbησ + αb(1− ησ)
µ 1
ν−1
Table 3: Model Parameters.
Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 Preferences discount factor
σ−1 1/2 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption
ϕ−1 1/3 Frisch elasticity of labor supply
αs 0.6 Degree of home bias in the regions
αb 0.85 Degree of home bias in the areas
ε 6 Elasticity of substitution across varieties
ν 6 Elasticity of substitution across labor types
θ 0.75 Probability of resetting prices
ρa 0.9 Autocorrelation of technological shocks
ρµ 0.9 Autocorrelation of mark-up shocks
τ 0 Steady-state labor subsidy
σa 0.0055 Standard deviation of technological shocks
σµ 0.0262 Standard deviation of mark-up shocks
ςa,b 0.258 Correlation of productivity shocks across areas
ςa,s 0.3 Correlation of productivity shocks across regions
ςµ,b 0.129 Correlation of mark-up shocks across areas
ςµ,s 0.15 Correlation of mark-up shocks across regions
Table 4: Baseline Parameterization.
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Appendix
A The Model
A.1 Preferences
Agents are infinitely lived and maximize the expected value of the discounted sum of
the per-period utility. Preferences of a generic household s of region i are defined over
a private consumption bundle, Cit , and a labor service s
i, Nt(s
i):
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
Ci1−σt
1− σ −
Nt(s
i)ϕ+1
ϕ+ 1
]
0 < β < 1 (31)
where β is the intertemporal preferences discount factor. Agents consume all the
goods produced in the world economy, but preferences exhibit home bias. The private
consumption index is a CES aggregation of the following type:
Cit ≡
[
α
1
η
s C
i η−1
η
i,t + (αb − αs)
1
ηC
i η−1
η
H,t + (1− αb)
1
ηC
i η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1
(32)
for all i ∈ [0, 12), η > 0, 0 < αs < αb and 12 < αb < 1. αs and αb are the degrees
of home bias for the goods produced within region i and the area to which region i
belongs, respectively. At the same time the consumption bundles CiH,t, C
i
F,t and C
i
i,t
are defined as:
CiH,t ≡
[
2
1
η
∫ 1
2
0
C
i η−1
η
j,t dj
] η
η−1
CiF,t ≡
[
2
1
η
∫ 1
1
2
C
i η−1
η
j,t dj
] η
η−1
(33)
Cij,t ≡
(∫ 1
0
cit(h
j)
ε−1
ε dhj
) ε
ε−1
j ∈ [0, 1
2
) Cij,t ≡
(∫ 1
0
cit(f
j)
ε−1
ε df j
) ε
ε−1
j ∈ [1
2
, 1]
(34)
where η denotes the elasticity of substitution both between CiH,t, C
i
F,t and C
i
i,t and
between different Cij,t with j 6= i, while ε represents the elasticity of substitution among
goods produced in the same region. The definition of the private consumption index
(32) enables us to determine a consistent definition for the consumers’ price index of
region i, given by:
PCi,t ≡
[
αsP
1−η
i,t + (αb − αs)P 1−ηH,t + (1− αb)P 1−ηF,t
] 1
1−η
(35)
for all i ∈ [0, 12), where all prices are denominated in the currency of the home coun-
try. The variables Pi,t, PH,t and PF,t are producers’ price indexes that are defined
consistently with the other consumption indexes (33) and (34). The law of one price
is assumed to hold in all single-good markets. However, given the home bias in prefer-
ences, in general purchasing power parity does not hold for indexes PCi,t. Symmetric
definitions apply to the region of area F .
A.2 Firms, technology and price setting
In each region i there is a continuum of firms. Each of them produces a single differ-
entiated good with a constant return to scale technology of the type:
yt(h
i) = AitNt(h
i) (36)
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with Nt(h
i) =
[∫ 1
0 Nt(s
i, hi)
υit−1
υit dsi
] υit
υit−1
being the labor input bundle, composed of
a continuum of imperfectly substitutable labor services.47 Moreover, Ait is the region-
specific technology shock. Given (36) and the fact that Nt(s
i, hi) = Nt(h
i) for all hi
and si, the aggregate relationship between output and labor can be written as:
N it =
Y it
Ait
Zit (37)
where Y it ≡
[∫ 1
0 yt(h
i)
ε−1
ε dhi
] ε
ε−1
, Zit ≡
∫ 1
0
yt(hi)
Y it
dhi and N it ≡
∫ 1
0 Nt(h
i)dhi. Using the
demand functions one can show that Zit =
∫ 1
0
(
pt(hi)
Pi,t
)−ε
dhi; thus Zit can be interpreted
as an index of the relative price dispersion or output dispersion across firms. We assume
that goods prices adjust according to a staggered mechanism a` la Calvo. Therefore,
in each period a given firm can re-optimize its price only with probability 1 − θ. As
a result, the fraction of firms that set a new price is fixed and the aggregate producer
price index of the intermediate goods evolves accordingly to:
P 1−εi,t = θP
1−ε
i,t−1 + (1− θ)p˜t(hi)1−ε (38)
with p˜t(h
i) being the optimal price. Firms maximize the discounted expected sum of
the future profits that would be collected if the optimal price could not be changed,
namely:
∞∑
s=0
(θ)sEt
{
Qit,t+syt+s(h
i)
[
p˜t(h
i)−MCni,t+s
]}
(39)
where yt(h
i) =
(
pt(hi)
Pi,t
)−ε
Y it and MC
n
i,t =
(1−τ i)Wi,t
Ait
is the nominal marginal cost with
τ i denoting a constant labor subsidy.
A.3 International risk sharing
The assumption of complete markets implies:
Cit
−σ
PCi,t
=
Cjt
−σ
Eij,tPCj ,t
(40)
for all t, i ∈ [0, 12) and j ∈ [12 , 1], where Eij,t denotes the nominal exchange rate of region
j currency relative to region i currency. By appropriately integrating this equation we
obtain:
Ci−σt
PCi,t
=
C∗−σH,t
EiH,tP ∗H,t
i ∈ [0, 1
2
)
Ci−σt
PCi,t
=
C∗−σF,t
EiF,tP ∗F,t
i ∈ [1
2
, 1]
C∗−σH,t
P ∗H,t
=
C∗−σF,t
EHF,tP ∗F,t
(41)
for all i, where C∗H,t ≡
[
2
∫ 1
2
0 C
j−σ(1−η)
t dj
] −1
σ(1−η)
and P ∗H,t ≡
[
2
∫ 1
2
0
(EHj,tPCj ,t)(1−η) dj] 1(1−η) .
Symmetric definitions apply to C∗F,t and P
∗
F,t.
Here EHi,t stands for the nominal exchange rate of region i currency to a common
unit of account of area H. Note that within area F , EFi,t = 1 for all i ∈ [12 , 1].
47By assumption, therefore, every household works in all firms.
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Conversely within area H, EHi,t = 1 for all i ∈ [0, 12) only under regimes B and C.
Finally, in general, EHF,t is floating under both regimes A and B while it is fixed to 1
under regime C.
Given the definitions of P ∗H,t and P
∗
F,t it is easy to show that:
EiH,tP ∗H,t = [αbPH,t1−η+(1−αb)PF,t1−η]
1
1−η EiF,tP ∗F,t = [αbPF,t1−η+(1−αb)PH,t1−η]
1
1−η
(42)
By (42):
EiH,tP ∗H,t
PH,t
=
[
αb + (1− αb)
(
PF,t
PH,t
)1−η] 11−η EiF,tP ∗F,t
PF,t
=
[
αb + (1− αb)
(
PH,t
PF,t
)1−η] 11−η
(43)
which jointly with (41) leads to:
(
C∗F,t
C∗H,t
)
=
αb
(
PF,t
PH,t
)1−η
+ (1− αb)
(1− αb)
(
PF,t
PH,t
)1−η
+ αb

− 1
σ(1−η)
(44)
Moreover thanks to the fact that:48
PCi,t ≡
[
αsPi,t
1−η + (αb − αs)PH,t1−η + (1− αb)PF,t1−η
] 1
1−η (45)
Pi,t
PCi,t
=
[
1
αs
− αb − αs
αs
(
PH,t
PCi,t
)1−η
− (1− αb)
αs
(
PF,t
PCi,t
)1−η] 11−η
i ∈ [0, 1
2
) (46)
from which using (41) it follows that:
Pi,t
PCi,t
=
 1
αs
− αb − αs
αs
(
PH,t
EiH,tP ∗H,t
C∗−σH,t
Ci−σt
)(1−η)
− (1− αb)
αs
(
PF,t
EiF,tP ∗F,t
C∗−σF,t
Ci−σt
)(1−η) 11−η
(47)
Finally, by using (43) and (44) we can rewrite (47) as:
Pi,t
PCi,t
=
[
γs + (γb − γs)
(
C∗H,t
Cit
)−σ(1−η)
+ (1− γb)
(
C∗F,t
Cit
)−σ(1−η)] 11−η
(48)
for i ∈ [0, 12) and where γs ≡ 1αs and γb ≡
αb
2αb−1 . A corresponding condition can be
retrieved for area F .
A.4 The Non-Linear Equilibrium Conditions
Given the assumptions on preferences, technology and international risk sharing dis-
cussed in the previous sections, the market equilibrium is determined by the following
48This definition for the consumers’ price index of region i follows from the assumption of CES preferences
as stated in Appendix B.
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conditions:
Y it =
(
Pi,t
PCi,t
)−η (
αsC
i
t + (αb − αs)CitσηCH,t + (1− αb)CitσηCF,t
)
i ∈ [0, 1
2
) (49)
Y it =
(
Pi,t
PCi,t
)−η (
αsC
i
t + (αb − αs)CitσηCF,t + (1− αb)CitσηCH,t
)
i ∈ [1
2
, 1] (50)
Kit =
(
Y it
Ait
)ϕ+1
Zit
ϕ
(1 + µit)(1− τ i)
ε
ε− 1 + βθEt
{
Πεi,t+1K
i
t+1
}
i ∈ [0, 1] (51)
F it = Y
i
t C
i
t
−σ Pi,t
PCi,t
+ βθEt
{
Πε−1i,t F
i
t
}
i ∈ [0, 1] (52)
F it = K
i
t
(
1− θΠε−1i,t
1− θ
) 1
ε−1
i ∈ [0, 1] (53)
Zit = θZ
i
t−1Π
ε
i,t + (1− θ)
(
1− θΠε−1i,t
1− θ
) ε
ε−1
i ∈ [0, 1] (54)
1
1 + rit
= βEt
{(
Cit+1
Cit
)−σ
Pi,t+1
PCi,t+1
PCi,t
Pi,t
Π−1i,t+1
}
i ∈ [0, 1] (55)
C∗−σH,t
C∗−σH,t−1
PH,t
EiH,tP ∗H,t
EiH,t−1P ∗H,t−1
PH,t−1
Π−1H,t =
Ci−σt
Ci−σt−1
Pi,t
PCi,t
PCi,t−1
Pi,t−1
Π−1i,t i ∈ [0,
1
2
) (56)
C∗−σF,t
C∗−σF,t−1
PF,t
EiF,tP ∗F,t
EiF,t−1P ∗F,t−1
PF,t−1
Π−1F,t =
Ci−σt
Ci−σt−1
Pi,t
PCi,t
PCi,t−1
Pi,t−1
Π−1i,t i ∈ [
1
2
, 1] (57)
C∗−σH,t
C∗−σH,t−1
PH,t
EHF,tP ∗H,t
EHF,t−1P ∗H,t−1
PH,t−1
Π−1H,t =
C∗−σF,t
C∗−σF,t−1
PF,t
P ∗F,t
P ∗F,t−1
PF,t−1
Π−1F,t (58)
for all t with CH,t ≡ 2
∫ 1
2
0 C
j
t
1−ση
dj and CF,t ≡ 2
∫ 1
1
2
Cjt
1−ση
dj and where C∗F,t, C
∗
H,t
are properly defined in Appendix A.3 and P ∗F,t and EHF,tP ∗H,t/PH,t and EiH,tP ∗H,t/PH,t
are defined according to (43) and using (44). Similar definitions apply to their foreign
counterparts, while Pi,t/PCi,t is determined consistently with (48).
Conditions (49) and (50) represent the aggregate good market clearing conditions
and correspond up to a first order approximation to equation (3) and its foreign equiv-
alent. Conditions (51), (52) and (53) are direct consequence of the profit maximization
under Calvo pricing and can be approximated as in Phillips curve (1). Condition (55)
corresponds to a first order expansion of the Euler equation (6). Notice that under
regime A, rit = rF,t for all i ∈ [12 , 1], under regime B, rit = rH,t for all i ∈ [0, 12) and
rit = rF,t for all i ∈ [12 , 1], while under regime C rit = rH,t = rF,t for all i. The last
conditions (56), (57) and (58) embed the risk sharing conditions in (41) and can be
approximated up to the first order as in (7) and (8). In order to close the model we
need to determine the optimal policy rules under the different regimes.
B The Pareto-efficient allocation
In this appendix we solve the social planner problem and find the conditions that
characterize the Pareto-efficient allocation. The social planner maximizes the world
welfare with respect to Y it , N
i
t and C
i
j,t for all i and j:
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E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{∫ 1
0
Cit
1−σ
1− σ −
1
ϕ+ 1
N it
ϕ+1
di
}
(59)
where Cit is defined as in (32).
The constraints to the planner’s problem are:
Y it = C
i
i,t +
∫ 1
2
0
Cji,tdj +
∫ 1
1
2
Cji,tdj i ∈ [0, 1]
Y it = A
i
tN
i
t i ∈ [0, 1] (60)
As in Gal´ı and Monacelli (2009) we assume that the planner incorporates ex ante the
optimal condition whereby consumption and production of each variety are identical
within each region i. According to the first-order conditions:
Cit
−σ
=
αs(Y it ϕ+1
Ait
ϕ
)1−η
+ 2(αb − αs)
∫ 1
2
0
(
Y jt
ϕ+1
Ajt
ϕ
)1−η
dj + 2(1− αb)
∫ 1
1
2
(
Y jt
ϕ+1
Ajt
ϕ
)1−η
dj
 11−η
Y it
1+ϕη
Ait
(ϕ+1)η
=
[
αsC
i
t
1−ση
+ 2(αb − αs)
∫ 1
2
0
Cjt
1−ση
dj + 2(1− αb)
∫ 1
1
2
Cjt
1−ση
dj
]
(61)
for all i ∈ [0, 12). Symmetric conditions apply to each region i with i ∈ [12 , 1]. The
first condition in (61) states that at the margin the utility embedded into an additional
unit of the composite consumption bundle Cit should be equal to a CES aggregation of
the additional disutilities entailed by its production. Conversely, the second condition
in (61) rewrites the resource constraint in terms of aggregate consumption of each
region j by using the technological constraints and the other optimality conditions.
By taking the log-linear approximation to (61) and integrating them over i ∈ [0, 12)
we find that:
− σcˆeH,t = αb(ϕyˆeH,t − (ϕ+ 1)aˆH,t) + (1− αb)(ϕyˆeF,t − (ϕ+ 1)aˆF,t)
(1 + ϕη)yˆeH,t − (1 + ϕ)ηaˆH,t = (1− ησ)(αbcˆeH,t + (1− αb)cˆeF,t) (62)
where the suffix e stands for efficient. By combining the two conditions in (62) with
their symmetric counterparts for the foreign area, we obtain:
yˆeH,t =
ϕ+ 1
σ + ϕ
aˆH,t +
(δb − γb)σ(ϕ+ 1)
(σ + ϕ)((2γb − 1)σ + (2δb − 1)ϕ)(aˆH,t − aˆF,t) (63)
where the suffix e stands for efficient. Condition (63) expresses the log deviations of the
efficient level of output in area H in terms of area H productivity and the productivity
differentials between area H and F .
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